当地时间7月30日，欧洲足球管理机构欧足联及其55个成员国投票决定“抵制所有国际足联赛事”。
Workers assemble solar photovoltaic modules at a smart manufacturing workshop of Ronma Solar Energy Group in Jindong district of Jinhua city, East China's Zhejiang Province, on July 28, 2026. Photo: VCG
China saw robust exports in electric vehicles (EV), lithium batteries and photovoltaic products, known as the "new three," in the first half of this year. More notably, robotics, artificial intelligence (AI) and innovative drugs, which represent the future direction of industrial development, are also emerging as new calling cards for China's foreign trade.
However, the impressive performance provoked unease among some Western media outlets and politicians. Some have deliberately portrayed China's rapid industrial development and strong competitiveness as a result of government subsidies, pushing the false claim that subsidies have created overcapacity and those low-priced Chinese products are flooding global markets. Such fallacies, which simply equate industrial subsidies with overcapacity, are not only logically flawed but also factually groundless.
In practice, many countries adopt industrial policies tailored to their national conditions and development needs, such as providing research and development (R&D) subsidies for emerging industries and risk related subsidies for agriculture.
Well-designed industrial subsidies can help address market failures, promote technological innovation and environmental protection, reduce poverty and support balanced development, rather than cause so called "overcapacity."
Multiple reports by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development have noted that the number of industrial policies worldwide has grown rapidly over the past five years, with R&D subsidies, tax incentives and low interest loans for emerging industries becoming common international practices.
Forcibly linking industrial subsidies to "overcapacity" is, in essence, a political manipulation based on double standards. The US, for example, plans to provide $750 billion in various subsidies from 2022 to 2031 under its Inflation Reduction Act. Subsidized EVs are subject to requirements such as production and sales in the US or North America, effectively excluding other WTO members. US industrial subsidies for AI are even greater than those of all other countries combined.
Similarly, according to incomplete statistics, the European Commission is expected to provide more than 1.44 trillion euros ($210 billion) in various subsidies between 2021 and 2030. The EU's Industrial Accelerator Act links local content directly to financial support through "Made in EU" requirements, creating serious investment barriers and institutional discrimination.
Have these massive subsidies been labeled as causing "overcapacity"? The answer is no. While claiming that China's industrial subsidies lead to so-called overcapacity, these countries are themselves providing massive subsidies to their own industries. Such double standards amount to selective accusations targeting China, aimed at politicizing trade and economic issues and weaponizing industrial policy.
At a deeper level, accusations that "China's industrial subsidies cause overcapacity" are merely a pretext, reflecting growing anxiety and fear over the rising competitiveness of Chinese industries.
Looking back at the repeated hype in Western media, the criticism has consistently targeted China's most globally competitive industries, including new-energy vehicles, photovoltaics and power batteries. This exposes the real intention of shifting the blame for their own lagging industrial development onto China while stepping up restrictions against Chinese industries.
China's breakthroughs in these industries have been driven by advances in homegrown technologies, complete industrial and supply chains, and robust market competition, rather than by policy subsidies as some have claimed.
In recent years, China has taken multiple steps to regulate and improve its subsidy policies, from reviewing and correcting inappropriate local subsidies to exploring a unified negative list mechanism for local fiscal subsidies. China applies subsidies equally to all market entities, including foreign invested enterprises, strictly follows WTO rules, and continues to improve the compliance, effectiveness and transparency of its subsidy policies.
Rather than fabricating and hyping baseless claims about subsidies and obsessing over building trade barriers, certain Western media outlets and politicians should focus on addressing their own weaknesses and increasing investment in research and development. They should embrace healthy market competition with an inclusive mindset, promote mutual benefit through greater openness, and win markets and drive progress through genuine innovation.
This was compiled and translated by the Global Times English edition based on an article published in the "Chisu Jinsheng" economic commentary column of the People's Daily on August 10, 2026.。
二 | 欧足联在一份声明中表示：“我们一致且明确拒绝国际足联提出的‘将世界杯及其他国际足联赛事的所有权权益转让给私人投资者’的提案。只要这些提案依然存在，任何欧足联下属球队都不会参加任何国际足联赛事——除非该提案被彻底放弃，且国际足联作出具有约束力的保证，承诺永不再将其治理权或赛事向私有资本开放。”欧足联强调，“世界杯并非商品，不能被视为投资产品，更不能拱手让予私人投资者。
三 | ”欧足联指出，这一引发重大治理危机的提案“不仅是领导力的严重失职，更是国际足联作为世界足球守护者职责的弃守”。声明称：“一旦外部投资者获得国际足联赛事的所有权权益，足球运动将永久改变。商业回报将成为一项永久性义务，投资者的预期将变成日常压力。”在目前男足和女足世界排名前十的球队中，都各有六支来自欧洲，其中包括男足世界冠军西班牙队。
四 | 分析指出，欧足联的强硬立场令局势急剧升级，这对定于明年在巴西举办的2027年女足世界杯将产生直接影响。世界杯私有化？国际足联主席因凡蒂诺的计划旨在成立一家价值200亿美元的子公司来运营世界杯及其他赛事，并向私人投资者出售少数股权。他向国际足联旗下211个会员协会开出了条件：若在9月19日前同意该提案，各方将从2027年1月1日起获得总计100亿美元的资金包，每家协会可分得约4000万美元。若提案遭拒，资金包将回落至此前承诺的27亿美元，即每家协会约1000万美元。因凡蒂诺近日为这一计划辩解称，此举是在全球推广足球的“黄金机遇”，将释放“此前未被挖掘的商业价值”，并增加对各会员协会的资金支持。但他同时也强调，“这是机遇，而非义务”。
五 | 各大洲足联纷纷说“不”据悉，除了欧足联外，亚足联也向其下辖的47个会员协会发出了一封措辞激烈的信函，警告称若得不到六大洲际足协联盟的一致支持，该提案绝无成功可能。亚足联主席谢赫·萨勒曼·本·易卜拉欣·阿勒哈利法表示，国际足联的单方面行动似乎动摇了以团结、合作和透明为基础的洲际足球根基。
六 | 在国际足联公开宣布该提案前，亚足联未在任何层面受到咨询。
七 | 加之提案缺乏详细的治理、财务或法律分析，这“完全无法接受”。中北美及加勒比海足联及其41个会员协会在当地时间7月30日举行的会议上否决了国际足联出售世界杯股权的提案，但未效仿欧足联宣布抵制这一全球顶级赛事。
八 | 非洲足联执委会将于下周召开会议评估该提案。大洋洲足联将在下月会议上讨论此事。南美洲足联尚未公开发表评论。球员组织也对国际足联的计划表示反对。全球球员工会“国际职业足球运动员联合会”（FIFPRO）警告称，该提案将不可逆转地重塑支撑球员职业生涯的赛事激励机制。
